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INTRODUCTION 
In their article The Black Hole Problem in Commercial 
Boilerplate1 and its companion pieces,2 Stephen Choi, Mitu Gulati, and  
Robert Scott [hereinafter “CG&S”] introduce and explore the concept 
of “contractual black holes,” boilerplate contract provisions that have 
been “emptied of any recordable meaning”3 through rote repetition,4 
the introduction of essentially “random variations in language,”5 and 
the absence of “any validation [of their meaning] from courts or 
industry institutions.”6 The article presents a detailed case study of the 
sovereign debt market’s slow response to the Second Circuit’s errant 
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 1. Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in 
Commercial Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L.J. 1 (2017). 
 2. The other two papers in the Black Hole corpus are Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, & 
Robert E. Scott, Contractual Arbitrage, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
GOVERNANCE (Eric Brosseau, Jean-Michel Galmant & Jerome Sgaard eds., forthcoming 2017) 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/ viewcontent.cgi?article=6304&context=faculty_scholarship 
[https://perma.cc/VC3Y-QLKN] and Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, Variation 
in Boilerplate: Rational Design or Random Mutation, 19 AM. L. & ECON. REV. (forthcoming 
2017) [hereinafter, Choi et al., Variation in Boilerplate]. 
 3. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 2. 
 4. Id. at 6. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
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interpretation of the pari passu clause at issue in NML v. Argentina,7 a 
common clause in sovereign debt contracts that they view as the 
“prototypical exemplar”8 of a black hole. Noting that the NML 
decision put a multi-trillion dollar market at risk by making it more 
difficult to restructure sovereign debt,9 and that it took years for 
market transactors to draft clauses eliminating the problem,10 the 
authors conclude that changes in contract doctrine are needed to deal 
with the problems caused by black holes. As they explain, “while black 
holes often remain for many years as relatively harmless surplusage, 
they can [also] generate substantial social costs once litigation results 
in an interpretation that introduces inefficiencies into the market.”11 
This Comment focuses on the authors’ proposed doctrinal 
solution to the black hole problem, which seeks to eliminate any 
inquiry into “subjective intent” when courts are faced with the task of 
interpreting a black hole. It explores the conceptual and practical 
challenges of implementing the authors’ proposal and then questions 
whether legal reform is really needed to deal with the black hole 
problem. Part I identifies several common ways that standardized 
contract provisions that are often indistinguishable from true black 
holes may arise.12 It suggests that any doctrinal solution to the black 
hole problem will have to either reliably distinguish real black holes 
from these relatively common “black hole apparitions,” or be desirable 
when applied to both types of provisions.  Part II describes the 
proposed reform and explores the practical barriers to implementing 
 
 7. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 257 (2d Cir. 2012). The black 
hole corpus also focuses on an earlier interpretation of the pari passu clause rendered by a 
Brussels court in 2000. See Elliott Assocs. v. Republic of Peru, 948 F. Supp. 1203 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).  
 8. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 7. 
 9. Interestingly, the Second Circuit seemed to reject the idea that it was jeopardizing the 
market as a whole by making restructuring more difficult. See NML Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d at 263 
(explaining why this effect is unlikely to occur.)  
 10. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 70 (concluding that “the inherently greater inertia costs [and 
social costs] that result from an aberrant interpretation of a black hole term,” as compared to an 
ordinary unclear term, and the “greater difficulty market players face in overcoming the resulting 
collective action problem[s]” slow the adoption of new and better contractual terms). 
 11. Id.  
 12. Although it is possible that some of the types of clauses this Comment views as “black 
hole apparitions” would be classified as genuine black holes by CG&S, their search for additional 
examples of black holes by holding a conference on the subject at Duke Law School suggests that 
these ubiquitous types of clauses with uncertain meaning are unlikely to come within the purview 
of their definition. As Gulati explained, “black holes where meaning has been lost are different 
from provisions where there is a general sense of what they mean, but there is some vagueness or 
lack of clarity.” E-mail from Mitu Gulati, Professor of Law, Duke University, to author (Sept. 23, 
2017) (on file with author).  
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it. Along the way it also sketches out several alternative avenues for 
solving the problems evidenced in the pari passu saga. It suggests that 
these avenues, while more limited in scope than the authors’ proposed 
reform, may turn out to be more feasible and less costly to implement. 
Part III questions whether any doctrinal or other solution to the so-
called black hole problem can be justified on the basis of the lessons 
learned from the pari passu saga alone, given that other markets have 
been able to overcome collective action problems and adopt and 
amend standard-form contracts through processes that have tended to 
work more quickly and less contentiously over time. Finally, Part IV 
concludes by suggesting that the interpretive approach adopted by the 
Second Circuit in NML might be a passably good response to the black 
hole problem writ large. 
I.  A TYPOLOGY OF BLACK HOLE APPARITIONS 
CG&S suggest that contract doctrine should treat the 
interpretation of black holes differently from the interpretation of 
other unclear or essentially meaningless contractual provisions. Yet 
both conceptually and practically, it may be extraordinarily difficult to 
distinguish true black holes from what might be called “black hole 
apparitions.” Black hole apparitions are contract provisions that are 
indistinguishable on their face from black holes yet will not necessarily 
give rise to the drafting inertia and social costs that led CG&S to 
conclude that a doctrinal response to the black hole phenomenon was 
needed. Recognizing the existence of these apparitions suggests that 
any doctrinal reform that turns on a provision’s status as a black hole 
will,13 in practice, bring many black hole apparitions into its orbit. As a 
consequence, any such change is likely to add significant costs to 
ordinary commercial litigation and create and/or exacerbate 
opportunities for strategic behavior. Against this background, and to 
understand how common these apparitions are likely to be, it is useful 
to look more closely at three common types of black hole apparitions, 
those whose origins are procedural, relational or rational. 
 
 13. In order for a doctrine that conditions on whether a clause is or is not a black hole to be 
workable, a clause’s status must be verifiable by a court—that is, a court must be able to determine 
with reasonable accuracy at a cost the transactors consider reasonable from an ex ante perspective 
whether or not something is a black hole. See generally Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts and 
the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 
(1992).  
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A. Procedural Apparitions 
One category of black hole apparitions is what might be termed 
procedural apparitions—contract provisions that are at a high risk of 
losing their meaning due to state-supplied procedural rules or 
transactors’ procedure-related drafting choices. 
For example, black holes are especially likely to arise in markets 
where most contracts provide for arbitration under the American 
Arbitration Association’s (AAA) Commercial Arbitration Rules.14 
Although it is increasingly common for AAA arbitrators to produce 
reasoned opinions rather than mere awards,15 these opinions are 
typically kept private and are of no precedential value.16 As a 
consequence, the terms of these contracts (whether standard or 
bespoke) are correspondingly less likely to be interpreted in written 
opinions with precedential value and are at a heightened risk of 
gradually losing their meaning over time. The routine inclusion of a 
AAA arbitration clause, therefore, increases the risk that some of an 
agreement’s provisions will devolve into black hole apparitions.17 
 
 14. COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES (Am. Arbitration 
Ass’n 2013), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Commercial%20Rules.pdf. [https://perma.cc/
E8EW-CBBP]. 
 15. The AAA discourages written opinions but permits parties to request them. See 
CHARLES A. COOPER, HARRY KAMINSKY & NEIL CARMICHAEL, MANUAL FOR COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 162 (Am. Arbitration Ass’n 1999) (“Currently in domestic arbitrations, the AAA 
does not encourage commercial arbitrators to write opinions which give their reasons for the 
award. However, in instances where both parties request an opinion prior to the appointment of 
the arbitrator, the arbitrator should comply.”). While transactors might opt to revise a clause in 
face of a seemingly aberrant arbitration ruling, they might also surmise, much as the sovereign 
debt community did after the ruling of the Brussels court, that a more sensible panel (or as in the 
case of the pari passu clause the Second Circuit Court of Appeals) would rule differently. See 
Choi et al., supra note 1, at 12. 
 16. But see generally W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward a Theory of Precedent in Arbitration, 
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1895 (2010) (suggesting that in some contexts arbitration decisions that 
are not technically precedent nevertheless have an effect on the outcome of future disputes). In 
addition, there are indications that companies fear that arbitral decisions will be given some 
weight if they have future disputes with the same counter-party. For example, Verizon’s consumer 
agreement provides for AAA commercial arbitration, includes a class action waiver, and also 
contains a clause stating that “[a]n arbitration award and any judgment confirming it apply only 
to that specific case; it can’t be used in any other case except to enforce the award itself.” Customer 
Agreement, VERIZON WIRELESS (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.verizonwireless.com/legal/notices/
customer-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/3A2L-6YGT]; see also What’s Going on? Arbitration 
Explanation, WASTE MGMT., http://mediaroom.wm.com/legal-notice/ [https://perma.cc/TZ3C-X4
GB] (“The award of the arbitrator may be entered and enforced in any court having jurisdiction. 
An arbitration award and any judgment confirming it apply only to that specific case; it cannot be 
used in any other case except to enforce the arbitration award itself.”). 
 17. For example, trade association-run private legal systems are designed in ways that will 
BERNSTEIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2017  6:29 PM 
106 DUKE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE [Vol. 67:102 
Similarly, the standards of appellate review and the fact that most 
state and many federal trial courts do not routinely publish opinions18 
might also play a role in the emergence of some types of contractual 
black holes. The vast majority of appellate courts provide greater 
deference to lower-court decisions on question of fact than on 
questions of law, or in some jurisdictions, mixed questions of law and 
fact. As a consequence, the meaning of standard-like provisions that 
are interpreted using a highly fact-specific inquiry is less likely to be 
appealed than the meaning of rule-like provisions whose interpretation 
is more often considered a matter of law. Standard-like provisions are 
correspondingly less likely to be interpreted in a written opinion of any 
kind. They are therefore more likely than rule-like provisions to 
devolve into meaningless provisions that look like classic black holes.19 
B. Relational Apparitions 
A second type of black hole apparition, which might be called a 
relational apparition, is particularly likely to emerge: (1) where there is 
a written or standard-form template that is used in most deals in a 
particular market; or (2) where seemingly bespoke contracts are used,20 
but those who negotiate them (either the business people or the 
contract lawyers) share a rough but deeply ingrained understanding 
 
strongly discourage the emergence of black holes. At the National Grain and Feed Association, 
for example, arbitrators write reasoned opinions that are posted on the association’s website. 
When a rule is unclear, or appears to lead to an undesirable or unanticipated result, the arbitrators 
will state this explicitly, apply the rule as it is stated, and note that the association’s rules 
committee should consider revising the rule, something that is typically done. See Lisa Bernstein, 
Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 
144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1780 & nn.50–51 (1996).  
 18. STEVEN M. BARKEN, BARBARA A. BINTLIFF & MARY WHISNER, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
LEGAL RESEARCH 41 (10th ed. 2015) (“Ordinarily, cases decided by state trial courts are not 
reported. . . . Only a few states, such as New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, publish 
some trial court opinions, but those selected are few in number and represent only a very small 
portion of the total cases heard by trial courts.”). A similar problem may exist with respect to 
cases decided in federal court. See David A. Hoffman, Alan J. Izenman & Jeffrey R. Lidicker, 
Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 681, 727 (2007) (“[S]tarkly 
expos[ing] how little trial court work is explained through written opinions.”). 
 19. It is, however, possible that the doctrinal contours of the black hole or no black hole 
determination would become clearer over time because under the proposed change this would be 
determined as a “matter of law.” See Choi et al., supra note 1, at 68.  
 20. CG&S focus mostly on standard commercial provisions in standardized contracts. 
However, both black holes and black hole apparitions can arise in seemingly bespoke contracts 
as well. To the extent this phenomenon exists, the proposed reform, in as much as it seems to 
apply only to standard contracts with boilerplate provision, would be underinclusive with respect 
to the types of holes found in these seemingly bespoke agreements. 
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about the types and content of terms that are commonly included in 
such agreements. In both of these situations, transactors may be 
especially hesitant to propose changes to commonly used terms. When 
a transactor proposes a change in the usual way of doing things, even 
when that usual way is not terribly important or when the variant 
creates value for both transactors, her counter-party might well 
interpret it as a signal that she is either more likely to engage in 
strategic behavior or more focused on her legal rights than the average 
transactor. The counter-party might therefore ask for protective 
changes in response. This, in turn, might trigger a cascade of change 
requests that could greatly increase contracting costs, reduce the 
likelihood of post-signing cooperation,21 or destroy the deal 
completely.22 As long as transactors are aware of or intuit this dynamic, 
they might be reluctant to propose changing or eliminating common 
provisions, even if these provisions appear to be meaningless or 
irrelevant and standardization, across either the market as a whole or 
particular subsets of market participants, has no independent value. 
Relational black hole apparitions may also be common in markets 
where transactors trust one another or where the force of reputation-
based network governance is strong. In some markets where genuine 
interpersonal trust is present, it remains common for transactors to put 
the contract in the drawer. As a consequence, transactors will likely 
spend little or no time negotiating its terms. In these situations, 
contract language is quite likely to be unthinkingly recycled.23 
Similarly, in markets where transactors rely on reputation-based 
network governance to support exchange, using similar contracts 
across the market makes these reputation-based forces stronger.24 
 
 21. The way that a contract is negotiated has an effect on how well the business deal can be 
operationalized once the contract is signed. See Danny Ertel, Getting Past Yes: Negotiating as if 
Implementation Mattered, 85 HARV. BUS. REV. 60, 62 (2004). 
 22. For a more complete discussion of this bargaining dynamic and the way that it effects the 
terms of agreements, see generally Lisa Bernstein, Social Norms & Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. 
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 59 (1993). 
 23. Gillian K. Hadfield & Iva Bozovic, Scaffolding: Using Formal Contracts To Build 
Informal Relations to Support Innovation, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 981, 982, 987 (noting that Stewart 
Macaulay’s finding that in commercial contracting relationships problems tended to be worked 
out informally and “written contracts . . . were often highly-standardized documents that were 
often confined to the drawer,” held in a modern day sample of non-innovative firms where 
informal methods of dispute resolution remained common and firms either “did not generate 
[formal contracts] or relied only on standardized documents,” but did not hold in a sample of 
innovative firms). 
 24. See generally Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network 
Governance in Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 561 (2015) (explaining how widely 
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When contracts are relatively standardized and/or there is widespread 
consensus about what constitutes cooperation and good-faith 
behavior,25 the network need only transmit information about how a 
transactor behaved in order for other market participants to assess the 
desirability of dealing with him. In contrast, when contracts are more 
varied, information about both the scope of the relevant obligations 
and actual behavior may need to be transmitted through the relevant 
network in order for reputation to play an important role in governing 
exchange—a process that is bound to be more expensive, less effective, 
and more error prone than in markets where relatively standard 
agreements are used.26 Since lawsuits are less common in markets 
where genuine trust is present or network governance is operational, 
fewer terms in commercial contracts are likely to be interpreted by 
courts and both black holes and black hole apparitions are 
correspondingly more likely to arise. 
C. Rational Apparitions 
A third and final type of black hole apparition, and one that may 
also emerge in both standard-form and bespoke contracts, is a rational 
black hole. A rational black hole is a term that is left deliberately vague 
or without meaning at the time of contracting.27 The economic 
 
known and standardized contract provisions may affect the strength of network governance).  
 25. In some markets where reputation-based network governance plays an important role in 
contracting, some large companies post their quality requirements and their standard terms and 
conditions on their website so that the contours of what is and is not expected from their 
counterparties is known throughout the market. See, e.g., Supplier Quality Manual, JOHN DEERE, 
https://jdsn.deere.com/wps/portal/jdsn/Applications?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/wps/wcm/c
onnect/jdsn_website/jdsn/business+processes/quality/supplier_quality_manual/supplier_quality_
manual_index [https://perma.cc/57SG-BQUK]; Terms and Conditions for the Purchase of Goods 
and Services, JOHN DEERE, https://www.johndeerestore.com/jdb2cstorefront/JohnDeereStore/
en/terms [https://perma.cc/B7DH-QPQU]. 
 26. In such markets, general and impressionistic information about whether a transactor 
behaved properly or poorly could still be easily transmitted, but in the absence of standard terms, 
a consensus about what constitutes good behavior, or information about both what was promised 
and what was done, this information is likely to be given less weight (especially when it travels 
more than one step from its source) than information that circulates in markets where contracts 
and/or expectations are either relatively standardized or widely known.  Bernstein, supra note 24, 
at 578–89 (discussing how John Deere achieves this).  
 27. Sometimes the line between relational and rational black holes may be blurry. For 
example, Scott and Triantis note that it is often economically rational to use very standard-like 
terms like “good faith,” “reasonable efforts,” or “best efforts,” and leave it for the court to give 
these terms meaning ex post. Robert E. Scott & George Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in 
Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 835 (2006). However, once those terms become common in 
an industry’s contracts (or between a pair of long-term repeat dealers), their presence in contracts 
may be exceptionally sticky. If, for example, someone sends their counterparty a draft obligating 
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literature has identified a variety of reasons that the inclusion of such 
terms might be rational.28 Among them: transactors believe that they 
will be better able to devise a response to a contingency when it 
actually arises, since additional facts about its implications will be 
known; transactors conclude that the probability a contingency will 
arise is so low (or the variety of related contingencies is so large) that 
it is not worth dealing with any or all of them ex ante; and finally, 
transactors have divergent views of the bargaining power they will each 
have when and if the issue arises, leading each to favor dealing with it 
later. In addition, in some contexts, clauses may be left meaningless or 
vague simply because transactors realize that in the event of a dispute 
over the meaning of the clause, the aggrieved party is unlikely to have 
a credible threat to sue for any of a number of reasons, including: 
litigation costs, the reputational cost of litigation, the information they 
would have to divulge in discovery,29 or the fact that litigation would 
likely end their otherwise valuable contracting relationship. 30 
D. Conclusion 
In sum, the existence of black hole apparitions complicates any 
attempt to deal with the black hole problem through changes in general 
contract doctrine that are contingent on a term’s status as a black 
hole.31 There are likely to be many contexts where black holes cannot 
 
the counterparty (and themselves) to act in good faith, the relational costs of saying to one’s 
counter party, “well let’s spell that out” or “let’s leave that out” might be high. 
 28. For a discussion of rational reasons why many clauses are left vague or undefined, see 
Scott & Triantis, supra note 27, at 814–15. The literature conceptualizes these terms as 
agreements-to-agree or agreements to determine meaning of a term through negotiation or 
litigation if an interpretive dispute arises. 
 29. For a complete discussion of the ways that transactors’ “secrecy interest” in certain types 
of business information may affect the credibility of their threat to sue in a variety of contexts, 
see generally Omri Ben Shahar & Lisa Bernstein, The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law, 109 YALE 
L.J. 1885 (2000). 
 30. In contracting relationships like those between an Original Equipment Manufacturer 
and its suppliers of component parts where a lawsuit tends to end the parties contracting 
relationship, many contractual provisions that are formally enforceable may not operate in the 
shadow of the law at all. The reason is simple: if one of these provisions were breached in isolation, 
the promisee would not have a credible threat to sue since the expected recovery would be very 
unlikely to exceed the future value of the relationship as a whole. These “interior contract 
provisions” operate outside of the shadow of the law, unless and until they are breached in 
combination with enough other provisions that the counterparty concludes that there has been a 
breach of the contracting relationship that makes it worthwhile to end the transactors’ business 
relationship and sue. See Bernstein, supra note 24, at 570–71. 
 31. At one point in their analysis CG&S hint that it might be desirable to apply a knock-out 
rule to black hole terms akin to the rule adopted by some courts applying U.C.C. § 2-207. 
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be distinguished from black hole apparitions. In addition, depending 
on precisely how a black hole is defined, there are likely to be some 
instances where black holes exist yet the type of redrafting inertia that 
beset the sovereign debt market is unlikely to arise since the need for 
the type of market wide uniformity that is desirable when contracts are 
akin to financial instruments will not exist. As a consequence, any 
reform that conditions on a clause’s status as a black hole and applies 
to commercial contracts generally is likely to be overinclusive. By 
bringing commercial contracts dealing with the routine purchase and 
sale of goods and provision of services within its purview, any such 
reforms will increase litigation costs and create substantial social and 
private costs of their own. 
Indeed, the pari passu black hole itself can be understood as 
arising from a mix of the procedural, relational, and rational 
considerations that give rise to black hole apparitions. The pari passu 
is partly a procedural black hole. Historically, the law of sovereign 
immunity made it extraordinarily difficult to sue or collect judgments32 
from other nations.33 Although in recent years it has become easier to 
sue a sovereign,34 many collection barriers remain. These legal and 
procedural barriers may be one reason why prior to a Brussels court’s 
2000 decision in Elliott Associates v. Republic of Peru,35 there were no 
contemporary judicial decisions interpreting the meaning of pari passu 
provisions. The rote inclusion of the pari passu clause and the market’s 
slow reaction to the NML decision36 can also be understood as the 
 
However, this rule will also require black holes to be identified by courts and will therefore be 
unworkable for many of the same reasons discussed herein. 
 32. See Sadie Blanchard, Courts Without Enforcement: Adjudicating Reputation in the 
Sovereign Debt Market 6–7 (Oct. 27, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (concluding that “[e]ven 
though [the holders of sovereign debt] cannot enforce debtor states’ obligations through 
conventional judicial means, courts play a key role in the sovereign debt market . . . because they 
provide information that has the power to provoke reactions by third parties that are costly for 
the debtor or its agents,” so that “[c]reditors litigate because producing such information through 
the courts strengthens their leverage in settlement negotiations,” and makes reputation a more 
powerful force in the market).  
 33. See Julian Schumacher, Christoph Trebesch & Henrik Enderlein, Sovereign Defaults in 
Court 10–11 (May 6, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=2189997 [https://perma.cc/T2Q7-LNGN], (finding that only 5 percent of sovereign 
defaults resulted in litigation until the 2000s, when the proportion rose to nearly half).  
 34. See W. Mark C. Weidermaier, Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt, 2014 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 67, 68–70 (2014). 
 35. Cours d’Appel de Bruxelles, 8th Chamber, 2000/QR/92, Elliott Assocs. v. République de 
Peru, 2000/QR/92, Sept. 26, 2000.  
 36. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 257 (2d Cir. 2012). The black 
hole corpus also looks at the market’s nonresponse to a pari passu decisions of a Brussels court, 
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product of relational costs. As CG&S point out, as long as rating 
agencies did not downgrade bonds because the pari passu clause 
remained unchanged, individual issuers were wary of changing the 
clause and potentially triggering a negative rating-agency response.37 
Finally, market players’ failure to revise the pari passu clause after the 
aberrant court judgments may or may not have been rational.38 
However, the decision not to attend to its meaning more precisely at 
the time indentures were drafted may have been rational. After all, if 
the clause had not been interpreted in court for such a long period, the 
expected benefit of tinkering with it in a purposeful way might properly 
have been seen as small. Together, these considerations suggest that 
even on a purely conceptual level the line between a contract provision 
whose meaning has been eroded as a result of procedural, relational, 
and rational considerations and a true black hole is quite difficult to 
demarcate with analytic precision. 
II.  THE PROPOSED DOCTRINAL RESPONSE 
CG&S acknowledge that at present we have only a limited 
understanding about the frequency of black holes and the contexts in 
which courts’ erroneous interpretations of widely used terms will be 
met with drafting inertia. Nevertheless, they conclude that immediate 
legal reform to deal with the black hole problem is needed. In their 
view, the “vexing collective action problems” that market participants 
face when attempting to respond to errant court interpretations are so 
significant that the potential social costs of not dealing with the black 
hole problem are too significant to ignore.39 
CG&S suggest that the best doctrinal way to deal with the black 
hole problem is for courts interpreting “boilerplate terms in 
commercial contracts”40 to be “open to arguments that as a matter of 
law, the clause in question has been emptied of meaning and functions 
 
but attributes it to market players’ beliefs that other, more important courts for the sovereign 
debt community would not follow such an aberrant decision.  
 37. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 49. 
 38. As CG&S point out, it might not have been individually rational for any one issuer to 
make these changes to their past and future indentures, even though it would have been rational 
for the market as a whole to move to a different term. Id. at 13. 
 39. Id. at 37 (“We use both qualitative and quantitative data to support the claim that courts 
searching for shared intent in the case of black holes in standardized contracting can result in 
substantial social costs.”). 
 40. Id. at 67. 
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as a black hole in boilerplate.”41 In cases in which the parties meet the 
burden of establishing the existence of a black hole, the court would 
then be required to adopt an interpretive approach that avoids any 
inquiry into subjective intent and looks to other interpretive principles 
to decide the case.42 Under the proposed approach, the hole or non-
hole determination would turn on a variety of highly fact-specific 
considerations and types of evidence. These include the types of 
evidence adduced in the pari passu case study,43 as well as the types of 
information needed to answer the following questions: 
Has the clause been repeated by rote over many years, without having 
been tested in litigation, where repetition has robbed the term of any 
obvious conventional meaning? Has the term been embedded in 
layers of legal jargon such that its intelligibility is substantially 
reduced and variations in the formulation of the term across contracts 
have no apparent significance? Is a historic or original meaning of the 
term accessible in a fashion that makes sense in the contemporary 
context and are contemporary commercial actors aware of that 
meaning? Is there credible evidence that the particular provision was 
priced at the original issue stage?44 
Notwithstanding its theoretical appeal, the implementation of this 
approach faces significant practical challenges. First, the test will be 
widely overinclusive even with respect to standard provisions in 
standard-form contracts because answers to these questions will not 
reliably distinguish black holes from black hole apparitions.45 
Moreover, because the new test applies to all standard commercial 
agreements, it gives a significant advantage to the party with deeper 
pockets who might claim a black hole exists simply to increase putative 
litigation costs and thereby lever a better settlement. 
Second, and relatedly, as CG&S themselves acknowledge, 
introducing this inquiry would open the door to moral hazard and other 
types of strategic behavior.46 Although they suggest that moral hazard 
 
 41. Id. at 68. 
 42. See id. at 66–67, 69 Exactly what this alternative interpretive approach would be is not 
specified in great detail. See id. at 54–56. If, instead, some form of knock-out rule were 
contemplated, similar problems would arise. See supra note 31. 
 43. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 38. 
 44. Id. at 68. 
 45. Indeed, the methodology CG&S used to reach the conclusion that the pari passu 
provision was a black hole, rather than an efficient contract term, relied on extensive information 
about the market’s response to the decision over a period of years. See id. at 11. 
 46. The types of strategic behavior it would introduce are analogous to those identified in 
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can be adequately dealt with by adopting “an initial presumption 
against the existence of a black hole,”47 even if they are correct the risk 
of strategic behavior will remain substantial. 
Third, even abstracting from overinclusiveness and strategic 
behavior, as a practical matter the type of information CG&S view as 
relevant to the black hole or non-black hole determination, will often 
be either unavailable to the parties or prohibitively costly to obtain.48 
For example, in contexts where the relevant contracts are not disclosed 
under the securities laws, transactors’ reluctance to share this 
information will make it impossible to get the contracts used in similar 
transactions—an evidentiary problem that will prevent courts from 
answering many of the questions that CG&S view as directly relevant 
to the hole or no-hole determination. Similarly, there is no obvious way 
to determine whether a particular clause has been priced into a 
contract. In many settings, price and other terms are negotiated 
separately, and even when they are not, determining the connection 
between price and a particular term may be difficult either because the 
transactors did not explicitly think about the connection or because 
reconstructing the sequence of a negotiation from the testimony of 
witnesses with conflicting agendas is likely to be an error-fraught 
process. In addition, market players, even those who willingly spoke to 
academics, might be reluctant to talk to litigators or testify in court. 
Thus, even if in theory the hole or no-hole determination could be 
accurately made on the basis of the types of evidence that CG&S view 
as relevant, in practice much of this information is likely to be either 
prohibitively expensive or entirely unavailable.  
Fourth, while CG&S want the courts to intervene when “parties 
exploit” either the absence of meaning or the presence of “random 
variations in language [to advance] an interpretation the market 
disavows,”49 they offer little guidance on how random variants can be 
distinguished from what they call “rational design,”50 a determination 
that would likely create both evidentiary problems and additional 
interpretive uncertainty.51 
 
Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE 
L.J. 541, 587 (2000) and Lisa Bernstein, Custom in the Courts, 110 NW. L. REV. 63, 106–08 (2015). 
 47. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 68. 
 48. Id. at 55–56, 64. 
 49. Id. at 1. 
 50. Choi et al., Variation in Boilerplate, supra note 2, at 4. 
 51. CG&S undertake just this inquiry in another part of the black hole corpus. See id. at 6. 
There, the authors seek to demonstrate that the observed variations in the pari passu clauses used 
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Finally, without a more detailed description of the interpretive 
rule that the court would apply when a hole is found and a better sense 
of the extent to which the chosen rule would result in predictable 
outcomes, it is difficult to asses how frequently the disputing parties 
will have the proper incentives to take advantage of the proposed 
reform and argue that black holes exist, even in contexts where they 
both believe that a true black hole actually exists. 
Consider, for example, a context in which both parties think that 
the best subjective interpretation of a clause that they can advance is 
better than the expected interpretation they think a court would give 
the clause if a black hole were found to exist.52 In such a situation, both 
parties might opt not to argue for a hole’s existence even if they both 
genuinely believe that a hole exists. To see why, consider a plaintiff 
who is trying to decide whether to plead that a hole exists or to advance 
her own subjective interpretation of a clause. If she pleads that a hole 
exists, the defendant faces a strategic choice. If he pleads that a hole 
exists, then the court will likely find that a hole exists, deem the 
subjective intent of the parties irrelevant, and interpret the clause using 
its own interpretive principles. In contrast, if the defendant pleads his 
subjective interpretation, the court will either accept his subjective 
interpretation or conclude that a hole exists, deem subjective intent 
irrelevant, and decide the case using its own interpretive principles. 
Because (by assumption) both parties believe that their subjective 
interpretation is better than the court’s interpretation, if the plaintiff 
pleads that a hole exists, the defendant is better off pleading that his 
subjective interpretation should govern. This response creates at least 
some chance that the court will accept his preferred subjective 
interpretation. Alternatively, if the plaintiff pleads her own subjective 
interpretation of the clause, the defendant will reason that he is always 
better off pleading his subjective interpretation than claiming that a 
hole exists. If he argues for his subjective interpretation, there is at least 
some possibility that the court will accept his interpretation, whereas if 
 
in sovereign debt contracts are the result of random mutation rather than rational design. The 
information and analysis they present is a good proxy for how difficult it would be for a transactor 
to litigate this distinction in court. Moreover, not all of the information they refer to could be 
known at trial—for example, how the market would respond if the court gave weight to a small 
drafting difference.  
 52. When real black holes actually exist, parties are likely to be largely unconstrained with 
respect to the range of plausible subjective intents they can proffer. As a consequence, the 
assumptions made in the text are likely to characterize a meaningful subset of the cases that might 
arise.  
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he pleads a hole, the court will find either find that a hole exists or 
accept the plaintiff’s subjective interpretation. Thus, regardless of the 
plaintiff’s choice, the defendant is always better off arguing for his 
subjective interpretation of the clause. Given this, the plaintiff too is 
better off arguing for her own subjective interpretation of the clause, 
since doing so creates at least some chance that her interpretation will 
be accepted by the court. As a consequence, at least in the run of 
situations where both parties think that the best subjective 
interpretation of the clause they can advance is better than the 
expected interpretation the court would give the clause, they are 
unlikely to avail themselves of the proposed doctrinal step even when 
a hole exists. Indeed, in the NML case itself neither party asserted that 
the pari passu clause was without meaning. Rather each side advanced 
an argument that it meant something different.53 
A. Other Directions for Reform 
In sum, proposals to alter contract doctrine to respond to the black 
hole problem may be difficult to implement in practice. As a 
consequence, to the extent that the problems revealed in the pari passu 
saga are wide-spread, it is worthwhile to explore whether there are 
approaches that do not rely on the hole-or-no-hole distinction that 
could prove to be a more workable response to the black hole problem. 
If, for example, the inertia problem were found to exist more 
broadly in particular contexts—such as markets where the contracts 
are closer to the pole of financial instruments than ordinary contracts 
for services or the sale of goods54—a separate article of the UCC could 
be added that would apply different interpretive standards as a matter 
of course.55 This change would have the advantage of eliminating the 
costly and uncertain black hole inquiry.56 Nevertheless, given the well-
 
 53. See, e.g., Brief of Defendant-Appellant the Republic of Argentina, NML Capital, Ltd. v. 
Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 257 (2d Cir. 2012) (Nos. 12-105cv(L) et al.), 2012 WL 
6777133; Joint Response Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees NML Capital, LTD and Olifant Fund, 
LTD, 699 F.3d 246, 257 (2d Cir. 2012) (Nos. 12-105cv(L) et al.), 2013 WL 388621. 
 54. CG&S are careful to delineate a number of reasons that the collective action problems 
they observe in the sovereign debt markets where the contracts at issue—bond indentures—are 
in practice closer to the pole of financial instruments, may be particularly severe compared to the 
collective action problems that might or might not impede the revision of ordinary contracts for 
sales of goods or provision of services when a court makes an aberrant interpretation of one of 
their terms. See Choi et al., supra note 1, at 59–66. 
 55. The reform could take the form of a new sub-chapter of Article 2 akin to Article 2A on 
leases, or an additional subset of rules in Article 2 akin to its merchant rules.  
 56. While such a change would raise the issue of how to decide which contracts would come 
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known problems that impede the American Law Institute (ALI) and 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
(NCCUSL) rules creation processes, such an approach, however 
desirable, might also prove infeasible.57 
Alternatively, if the black hole problem turns out to be widespread 
in certain types of well-defined markets or types of contracts, 
eliminating any inquiry into subjective intent in those contexts would 
achieve most of the benefits of the proposed black hole reform without 
increasing litigation costs or the frequency of strategic behavior. Black 
holes aside, eschewing the legal fiction of subjective intent in the 
interpretation of commercial contracts and adopting a largely textualist 
plain-meaning oriented interpretive approach is a reform that would 
likely prove highly beneficial for sophisticated commercial 
transactors58 for reasons that have long been advanced by the neo-
formalist school of contract interpretation.59 
Indeed, the neo-formalist approach reflected in the Second 
 
within the new Article’s purview, it could be made available to the parties on an opt-in basis at 
the time of contracting, subject to rejection by a court that found the choice to be inappropriate. 
 57. For an overview of the problems with these private uniform law-making bodies, see 
generally Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 
U. PA. L. REV., 595–654 (1995). For an example of the difficulties of creating new Articles of the 
UCC in particular, consider the largely failed effort to get states to adopt the Uniform Computer 
Information Transactions Act, which has been adopted by only two states. See The Uniform 
Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) Is a Proposed State Contract Law, UCITA 
ONLINE, http://www.ucitaonline.com/ [https://perma.cc/8SUP-W2L8] (discussing the 
impediments to adopting the model law).  
 58. The best available, though imperfect, empirical evidence suggests that sophisticated 
commercial parties prefer textualist adjudication. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Modern 
Economy, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 251 (Gregory Klass, George 
Letsas & Prince Saprai eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2014) (noting the common use of plain meaning 
clauses in large commercial contracts providing for arbitration); Lisa Bernstein, Private 
Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and 
Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001) (documenting the cotton industry’s preference for a 
textualist/formalist adjudicative approach); see also Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Modern 
Economy, supra (documenting the grain and feed industry’s preference for a textualist/formalist 
legal approach); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical 
Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts, 30 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1475 (2009) (demonstrating commercial actors’ strong preferences for 
relatively formalist New York Law); Stuart Popham, The View of European Business: Survey 
Results Presentation, CLIFFORD CHANCE LLP (Mar. 14, 2008), 
http://denning.law.ox.ac.uk/news/events_files/Popham_-_presentation.PPT [https://perma.cc/DR
B3-KXAL] (finding that in business contracts that provided for arbitration at the International 
Chamber of Commerce, transactors preferred British law, the most formalistic and textualist of 
the EU alternatives).  
 59. See generally Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE 
L.J. 926 (2010) (defending a formalist approach to contract interpretation). 
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Circuit’s NML decision can be understood as taking aim at one of the 
causes of black holes—namely, encrustation. According to CG&S, 
encrustation is the end result of the meaningless drafting changes that 
lawyers introduce either without thinking or to show their clients they 
are doing something. By signaling that the court may well attach 
radically different meanings to clauses with small wording differences, 
the approach taken by the NML court does two key things: it increases 
the cost of meaningless amendments and should therefore discourage 
them; and it increases the return to meaningful amendments since the 
court will take them into account in interpreting the clause which 
should, in turn, encourage meaningful drafting. It can therefore be 
understood as an interpretive penalty default rule that should over 
time change drafting behavior in ways that may reduce the amount of 
meaningless encrustation in commercial agreements and with it the 
likelihood that black holes will emerge. 
Nevertheless, despite the potentially significant problems that 
black holes may create and the many possible directions legal reform 
might take,60 the current understanding of black holes may be far too 
limited to devise sufficiently nuanced reforms. As discussed further 
below, there are reasons to question whether the saga of the pari passu, 
which is the empirical foundation of CG&S’s call for immediate 
reform, is, on its own, sufficient to justify the need for an immediate 
and generally applicable legal response, especially given the many 
differences—differences CG&S carefully delineate—between bond 
indentures and the other types of contracts the proposed reform would 
govern. 
 
 60. Another potential direction for reform that could be implemented without changing the 
common law, but that depends critically on the ability of groups—like state legislatures, the ALI, 
the NCCUSL, trade associations, and a variety of private entities and intermediaries—to revise 
contractual language when courts make errant decisions, would be to selectively adopt the reform 
proposals of the legal choice theorists. See HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL HELLER, THE CHOICE 
THEORY OF CONTRACTS 102–13 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2017). These theorists explore the 
benefits that might accrue when states and other private and public entities provide more 
“contract types” that transactors could use to structure their affairs—much as Delaware law offers 
those structuring a business the option of incorporating as a public entity, a close corporation, an 
LLC or a partnership. If these “types” were carefully developed, and proved easier to change in 
the event of an errant judicial interpretation of their terms than individually structured 
agreements, heeding the call for the creation of these types may help solve the black hole problem 
in some contracting contexts. See infra notes 61–65 and accompanying text (noting that trade 
associations have proved remarkably able to amend their trading rules and standard form 
contracts in response to arbitral interpretations of these terms). But see Schwartz & Scott, infra 
note 59 (discussing the problems that groups like the ALI have in revising their model laws). 
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III.  IS IMMEDIATE REFORM NEEDED? 
Given the many difficulties that stand in the way of a legal solution 
to the black hole problem, it is important to explore whether legal 
reform is really needed. The answer to this question turns, in large part, 
on whether the inertia in revising contract terms after an aberrant 
decision interpreting a black hole is likely to be a frequent occurrence 
across a variety of markets. It also depends on whether those black 
holes that do emerge are likely to be enduring phenomena or a 
transitory stage in the development of the relevant market. 
There is no systematic empirical evidence about the frequency of 
black holes. However, the experiences of American trade associations 
that created standard form contracts and trading rules to govern 
transactions among their members suggest that the inertia costs that 
stem from collective action problems and impede the adoption of new 
contract provisions, may decrease over time as industry participants 
and/or market institutions learn how to more quickly respond to the 
need for market-wide contractual change. 
In the textile industry, for example, the first edition of The Worth 
Street Textile Trading Rules,61 which consisted of both a set of trading 
rules and a standard textile sales note, took eighteen years of 
committee work to draft. The rules creation process “was fraught with 
conflict, [and] involved negotiations among numerous trade 
associations.”62 Yet once adopted, the rules were revised and even 
entirely rewritten numerous times far more quickly and with a great 
deal less infighting. Similarly, when the Silk Association of America set 
out to create a set of trading rules for raw silk, many controversies 
arose. The rules-creation process took seven years to complete because 
“[t]he get-together spirit was not sufficiently pronounced to override 
the differences that arose . . . .”63 Nevertheless, despite these initial 
difficulties, the Raw Silk Trading Rules, like the Worth Street Rules, 
were subsequently amended and revised many times with far less 
difficulty. A 1921 amendment, for example, was adopted after only “a 
year of careful study on the part of the [rules] Committee,”64 and a 1924 
 
 61. See Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation 
Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 730–32 (1999) (providing a short history of 
the Textile Trading Rules). 
 62. Id. at 732. 
 63. Id. at 736 (quoting SAA, THIRTY-FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT 23 (1907)). 
 64. Id. (quoting SAA, FORTIETH ANNUAL REPORT 31 (1912), Revision, 3 Silkworm 73 (May 
1921)). 
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amendment was adopted after mere “months of intensive effort.”65 
Similarly, the National Grain and Feed Association’s effort to adopt 
the first set of Grain Trading Rules was also hard-fought and filled with 
disagreement. Yet since their adoption, these rules have been 
successfully amended seventy-seven times, also with little infighting 
and only rare controversy. The experience of these and other industries 
suggests that while the initial costs of agreeing on standard contract 
terms and trading rules may be high, over time these costs tend to 
gradually decrease as market players and institutions get used to 
working with one another to respond to technological changes, market 
changes, and other types of disruptions that require  market-wide 
changes in contractual rules or forms. 
The experience of these and other groups is far from 
determinative; yet it provides a reason to be cautiously optimistic that 
the sovereign debt community will be able to respond more quickly in 
the future to any adverse court decisions that might once again 
threaten to impose large social costs on their market. There are even 
indications that this may already be happening.66 The pari passu case 
study reveals that when key market players first met at Columbia Law 
School to discuss the NML court’s interpretation of the pari passu 
clause in Argentine debt, the meeting was marked by so much 
“dissension and disagreement”67 that the prospect of “any significant 
movement towards wholesale revision of the clause [appeared] 
unlikely in the near term.”68 Nevertheless, when the Federal Reserve 
convened a meeting of many of the very same people just a few weeks 
later, it became clear that “everyone involved needed, and was willing 
to, cooperate in trying to solve the systemic problem caused by the 
rogue interpretation of the New York courts.”69 Legal change 
accelerated shortly thereafter.70 
The experience of American trade associations and the sovereign 
 
 65. Id. (quoting SAA, FIFTY-THIRD ANNUAL REPORT 26 (1925)). 
 66. For a detailed discussion of the institutional response to the pari passu problem which 
suggests that institutions “learn” each time they attempt responses, see Anna Gelpern, Ben Heller 
& Brad Setser, Count the Limbs: Designing Robust Aggregation Clauses in Sovereign 
Bonds, in TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE: THE QUEST TO RESOLVE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISES (Martin 
Guzman, José Antonio Ocampo & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., Columbia Univ. Press 2016).  
 67. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 40. 
 68. Id. at 39. 
 69. Id. at 40. 
 70. However, as CG&S point out, these revisions occurred only in sovereign debt—not 
quasi-sovereign debt—which in their view left the market facing significant social costs. Id. at 24–
25. 
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debt community’s own response when they came together at the 
Federal Reserve suggest that prudence is warranted in abstracting from 
the saga of the pari passu. It is far from certain that any future errant 
court decisions about the meaning of black holes in sovereign debt 
indentures will remain unremedied by collective action for a significant 
period of time. Only time and additional research on this and other 
markets will reveal whether the saga of the pari passu is best 
understood as: (1) an illustration of the transition problems that 
particular types of markets face when they are confronted with the 
need to overcome collective action obstacles to contractual change for 
the first time; (2) an enduring feature of markets where contracts are 
inter-dependent in ways that make the risk of judicial error more 
serious than in other markets; or (3) a problem that exists in a wider 
array of contracting contexts than standard contract theory would 
predict. 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment has explored some of the conceptual and practical 
problems that make it difficult to devise an effective legal strategy for 
dealing with black holes. It has also questioned whether or not a legal 
response to the black hole problem is needed. Still, nothing in the 
discussion has taken anything away from the core contribution of the 
black hole articles—namely, the identification of a distinct type of 
contract provision that poses unique interpretive challenges and may 
increase the consequences of judicial error in some contracting 
contexts. This contribution is particularly timely because black holes 
are likely to become increasingly common as a result of a number of 
technological changes that facilitate the creation of complex 
agreements with largely standardized yet slightly variant terms.71 
Nevertheless, until more is known about black holes in both the 
sovereign debt market and other contexts it might be best to refrain 
from undertaking any general doctrinal legal reforms in response to 
the phenomenon, especially as the type and magnitude of the problems 
caused by black holes are likely to be vastly different depending on the 
 
 71. See, e.g., KMSTANDARDS (2016), KMstandards.com [https://perma.cc/5KTY-Z2NJ]; 
IACCM (2017), IACCM.com [https://perma.cc/YH8G-8D73] (providing contract drafting 
software that permits the quick and inexpensive drafting of largely standard form contracts while 
giving transactors a variety of clauses to choose from), the website of the International 
Association of Contract and Commercial Managers [https://perma.cc/KKP7-3SMZ] (containing 
information about new contract drafting technologies). 
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market in question. 
Moreover, the cost of not responding to the problem may be far 
lower than it seems. The interpretive approach adopted by the Second 
Circuit in NML v. Argentina may turn out to be the best or at least a 
passably good long-run common law response to the black hole 
problem—especially in markets where the players (individuals, 
governments, and institutions) are sophisticated and are advised by 
able counsel. By functioning as an interpretive penalty default rule,72 
the Second Circuit’s adjudicative approach creates incentives for 
transactors and market intermediaries like rating agencies to pay more 
attention to drafting choices. It may also have the beneficial effect of 
encouraging new or existing market or quasi-governmental 
intermediaries to develop the institutional frameworks needed to 
provide the types of tailored responses to contracting problems that 
the common law cannot provide without introducing changes that will 
be vastly over- or underinclusive and will also be likely to increase both 
litigation costs and the incidence of strategic behavior. 
Interestingly, while CG&S remain critical of the NML decision, 
they now acknowledge that some type of institutional response 
(whether induced by the common law or encouraged by other types of 
government action) may, at the end of the day, be the best response to 
the black hole problem in the long-run. As they explain in reference to 
the interchange of ideas that led to this Comment: 
[T]he true lesson of our study may be that the IMF and other groups 
that constitute the ‘official sector’ may be better able than courts to 
solve these problems over time as they gain experience and become 
more confident in their methods. If this is so, then even though the 
pari passu case shows that the intervention of a public authority is 
sometimes required to solve contractual disputes that have third-
party effects, relying on the courts rather than private ordering to 
craft the solution may not always be the best choice.73 
 
 
 72. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory 
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91–130 (1989) (describing the theory of the penalty default 
rule). 
 73. Choi et al., supra note 1, at 69–70 (citing discussions with Bernstein). 
